While profiling all processes the profile buffer lives forever.
Once you have copied the profile to disk, there's no need to keep it
in memory. This syscall surfaces the ability to clear that buffer.
This should allow creating intrusive lists that have smart pointers,
while remaining free (compared to the impl before this commit) when
holding raw pointers :^)
As a sidenote, this also adds a `RawPtr<T>` type, which is just
equivalent to `T*`.
Note that this does not actually use such functionality, but is only
expected to pave the way for #6369, to replace NonnullRefPtrVector<T>
with intrusive lists.
As it is with zero-cost things, this makes the interface a bit less nice
by requiring the type name of what an `IntrusiveListNode` holds (and
optionally its container, if not RawPtr), and also requiring the type of
the container (normally `RawPtr`) on the `IntrusiveList` instance.
The previous architecture had a huge flaw: the pointer to the protected
data was itself unprotected, allowing you to overwrite it at any time.
This patch reorganizes the protected data so it's part of the Process
class itself. (Actually, it's a new ProcessBase helper class.)
We use the first 4 KB of Process objects themselves as the new storage
location for protected data. Then we make Process objects page-aligned
using MAKE_ALIGNED_ALLOCATED.
This allows us to easily turn on/off write-protection for everything in
the ProcessBase portion of Process. :^)
Thanks to @bugaevc for pointing out the flaw! This is still not perfect
but it's an improvement.
Process member variable like m_euid are very valuable targets for
kernel exploits and until now they have been writable at all times.
This patch moves m_euid along with a whole bunch of other members
into a new Process::ProtectedData struct. This struct is remapped
as read-only memory whenever we don't need to write to it.
This means that a kernel write primitive is no longer enough to
overwrite a process's effective UID, you must first unprotect the
protected data where the UID is stored. :^)
This returns ENOSYS if you are running in the real kernel, and some
other result if you are running in UserspaceEmulator.
There are other ways we could check if we're inside an emulator, but
it seemed easier to just ask. :^)
If we can't allocate a PerformanceEventBuffer to store the profiling
events, we now fail sys$profiling_enable() and sys$perf_event()
with ENOMEM instead of carrying on with a broken buffer.
I don't dare touch the multi-threading logic and locking mechanism, so it stays
timespec for now. However, this could and should be changed to AK::Time, and I
bet it will simplify the "increment_time_since_boot()" code.
fuzz-syscalls found a bunch of unaligned accesses into struct sigaction
via this syscall. This patch fixes that issue by porting the syscall
to Userspace<T> which we should have done anyway. :^)
Fixes#5500.
This is basically just for consistency, it's quite strange to see
multiple AK container types next to each other, some with and some
without the namespace prefix - we're 'using AK::Foo;' a lot and should
leverage that. :^)
This was necessary in the past when crash handling would modify
various global things, but all that stuff is long gone so we can
simplify crashes by leaving the interrupt flag alone.
Make more of the kernel compile in 64-bit mode, and make some things
pointer-size-agnostic (by using FlatPtr.)
There's a lot of work to do here before the kernel will even compile.
(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
This is a new promise that guards access to mmap() with MAP_FIXED.
Fixed-address mappings are rarely used, but can be useful if you are
trying to groom the process address space for malicious purposes.
None of our programs need this at the moment, as the only user of
MAP_FIXED is DynamicLoader, but the fixed mappings are constructed
before the process has had a chance to pledge anything.
The signal trampoline was previously in kernelspace memory, but with
a special exception to make it user-accessible.
This patch moves it into each process's regular address space so we
can stop supporting user-allowed memory above 0xc0000000.
Add a per-process ptrace lock and use it to prevent ptrace access to a
process after it decides to commit to a new executable in sys$execve().
Fixes#5230.
This patch adds Space, a class representing a process's address space.
- Each Process has a Space.
- The Space owns the PageDirectory and all Regions in the Process.
This allows us to reorganize sys$execve() so that it constructs and
populates a new Space fully before committing to it.
Previously, we would construct the new address space while still
running in the old one, and encountering an error meant we had to do
tedious and error-prone rollback.
Those problems are now gone, replaced by what's hopefully a set of much
smaller problems and missing cleanups. :^)
This patch adds sys$msyscall() which is loosely based on an OpenBSD
mechanism for preventing syscalls from non-blessed memory regions.
It works similarly to pledge and unveil, you can call it as many
times as you like, and when you're finished, you call it with a null
pointer and it will stop accepting new regions from then on.
If a syscall later happens and doesn't originate from one of the
previously blessed regions, the kernel will simply crash the process.
This prevents sys$mmap() and sys$mprotect() from creating executable
memory mappings in pledged programs that don't have this promise.
Note that the dynamic loader runs before pledging happens, so it's
unaffected by this.
This broke with the change that gave each process a list of its own
threads. Since threads are removed slightly earlier from that list
during process teardown, we're not able to use it for generating
coredump backtraces. Fortunately we have the "threads for coredump"
list for just this purpose. :^)
Since each Process now has its own list of threads, we don't need
to treat colonel any different anymore. This also means that it
reports all kernel threads, not just the idle threads.
Rather than walking all Thread instances and putting them into
a vector to be sorted by priority, queue them into priority sorted
linked lists as soon as they become ready to be executed.
Change Thread::current to be a static function and read using the fs
register, which eliminates a window between Processor::current()
returning and calling a function on it, which can trigger preemption
and a move to a different processor, which then causes operating
on the wrong object.
We now move the execpromises state into the regular promises, and clear
the execpromises state.
Also make sure to duplicate the promise state on fork.
This fixes an issue where "su" would launch a shell which immediately
crashed due to not having pledged "stdio".
Let's force callers to provide a VM range when allocating a region.
This makes ENOMEM error handling more visible and removes implicit
VM allocation which felt a bit magical.
This tells the kernel that the process wants to use pledge, but without
pledging anything - effectively restricting it to syscalls that don't
require a certain promise. This is part of OpenBSD's pledge() as well,
which served as basis for Serenity's.
Similar to LibC storing an assertion message before aborting, process
death by pledge violation now sets a "pledge_violation" key with the
respective pledge name as value in its coredump metadata, which the
CrashReporter will then show.
This adds support for FUTEX_WAKE_OP, FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET, FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET,
FUTEX_REQUEUE, and FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE, as well well as global and private
futex and absolute/relative timeouts against the appropriate clock. This
also changes the implementation so that kernel resources are only used when
a thread is blocked on a futex.
Global futexes are implemented as offsets in VMObjects, so that different
processes can share a futex against the same VMObject despite potentially
being mapped at different virtual addresses.
All users of this mechanism have been switched to anonymous files and
passing file descriptors with sendfd()/recvfd().
Shbufs got us where we are today, but it's time we say good-bye to them
and welcome a much more idiomatic replacement. :^)
The priority boosting mechanism has been broken for a very long time.
Let's remove it from the codebase and we can bring it back the day
someone feels like implementing it in a working way. :^)
Killing remaining threads already happens in Process::die(), but
coredumps are only written in Process::finalize(). We need to keep a
reference to each of those threads to prevent them from being destructed
between those two functions, otherwise coredumps will only ever contain
information about the last remaining thread.
Fixes the underlying problem of #4778, though the UI will need
refinements to not show every thread's backtrace mashed together.
This patch adds a new AnonymousFile class which is a File backed by
an AnonymousVMObject that can only be mmap'ed and nothing else, really.
I'm hoping that this can become a replacement for shbufs. :^)
The vast majority of programs don't ever need to use sys$ptrace(),
and it seems like a high-value system call to prevent a compromised
process from using.
This patch moves sys$ptrace() from the "proc" promise to its own,
new "ptrace" promise and updates the affected apps.
This patch merges the profiling functionality in the kernel with the
performance events mechanism. A profiler sample is now just another
perf event, rather than a dedicated thing.
Since perf events were already per-process, this now makes profiling
per-process as well.
Processes with perf events would already write out a perfcore.PID file
to the current directory on death, but since we may want to profile
a process and then let it continue running, recorded perf events can
now be accessed at any time via /proc/PID/perf_events.
This patch also adds information about process memory regions to the
perfcore JSON format. This removes the need to supply a core dump to
the Profiler app for symbolication, and so the "profiler coredump"
mechanism is removed entirely.
There's still a hard limit of 4MB worth of perf events per process,
so this is by no means a perfect final design, but it's a nice step
forward for both simplicity and stability.
Fixes#4848Fixes#4849
When loading non position-independent programs, we now take care not to
load the dynamic loader at an address that collides with the location
the main program wants to load at.
Fixes#4847.
This will enable us to take the desired load address of non-position
independent programs into account when randomizing the load address
of the dynamic loader.
This patch adds sys$abort() which immediately crashes the process with
SIGABRT. This makes assertion backtraces a lot nicer by removing all
the gunk that otherwise happens between __assertion_failed() and
actually crashing from the SIGABRT.
Commit a3a9016701 removed the PT_INTERP header
from Loader.so which cleaned up some kernel code in execve. Unfortunately
it prevents Loader.so from being run as an executable
Before this change, we would sometimes map a region into the address
space with !is_shared(), and then moments later call set_shared(true).
I found this very confusing while debugging, so this patch makes us pass
the initial shared flag to the Region constructor, ensuring that it's in
the correct state by the time we first map the region.
Rather than lazily committing regions by default, we now commit
the entire region unless MAP_NORESERVE is specified.
This solves random crashes in low-memory situations where e.g. the
malloc heap allocated memory, but using pages that haven't been
used before triggers a crash when no more physical memory is available.
Use this flag to create large regions without actually committing
the backing memory. madvise() can be used to commit arbitrary areas
of such regions after creating them.
This was a goofy kernel API where you could assign an icon_id (int) to
a process which referred to a global shbuf with a 16x16 icon bitmap
inside it.
Instead of this, programs that want to display a process icon now
retrieve it from the process executable instead.
This can happen when an unveil follows another with a path that is a
sub-path of the other one:
```c++
unveil("/home/anon/.config/whoa.ini", "rw");
unveil("/home/anon", "r"); // this would fail, as "/home/anon" inherits
// the permissions of "/", which is None.
```
This new flag controls two things:
- Whether the kernel will generate core dumps for the process
- Whether the EUID:EGID should own the process's files in /proc
Processes are automatically made non-dumpable when their EUID or EGID is
changed, either via syscalls that specifically modify those ID's, or via
sys$execve(), when a set-uid or set-gid program is executed.
A process can change its own dumpable flag at any time by calling the
new sys$prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) syscall.
Fixes#4504.
If the allocation fails (e.g ENOMEM) we want to simply return an error
from sys$execve() and continue executing the current executable.
This patch also moves make_userspace_stack_for_main_thread() out of the
Thread class since it had nothing in particular to do with Thread.
Process had a couple of members whose only purpose was holding on to
some temporary data while building the auxiliary vector. Remove those
members and move the vector building to a free function in execve.cpp
Now that the CrashDaemon symbolicates crashes in userspace, let's take
this one step further and stop trying to symbolicate userspace programs
in the kernel at all.
When a process crashes, we generate a coredump file and write it in
/tmp/coredumps/.
The coredump file is an ELF file of type ET_CORE.
It contains a segment for every userspace memory region of the process,
and an additional PT_NOTE segment that contains the registers state for
each thread, and a additional data about memory regions
(e.g their name).
This adds an allocate_tls syscall through which a userspace process
can request the allocation of a TLS region with a given size.
This will be used by the dynamic loader to allocate TLS for the main
executable & its libraries.
When the main executable needs an interpreter, we load the requested
interpreter program, and pass to it an open file decsriptor to the main
executable via the auxiliary vector.
Note that we do not allocate a TLS region for the interpreter.
This prevents zombies created by multi-threaded applications and brings
our model back to closer to what other OSs do.
This also means that SIGSTOP needs to halt all threads, and SIGCONT needs
to resume those threads.
This is necessary because if a process changes the state to Stopped
or resumes from that state, a wait entry is created in the parent
process. So, if a child process does this before disown is called,
we need to clear those entries to avoid leaking references/zombies
that won't be cleaned up until the former parent exits.
This also should solve an even more unlikely corner case where another
thread is waiting on a pid that is being disowned by another thread.
This makes the Scheduler a lot leaner by not having to evaluate
block conditions every time it is invoked. Instead evaluate them as
the states change, and unblock threads at that point.
This also implements some more waitid/waitpid/wait features and
behavior. For example, WUNTRACED and WNOWAIT are now supported. And
wait will now not return EINTR when SIGCHLD is delivered at the
same time.
This adds the ability to pass a pointer to kernel thread/process.
Also add the ability to use a closure as thread function, which
allows passing information to a kernel thread more easily.
This is a new "browse" permission that lets you open (and subsequently list
contents of) directories underneath the path, but not regular files or any other
types of files.
Most systems (Linux, OpenBSD) adjust 0.5 ms per second, or 0.5 us per
1 ms tick. That is, the clock is sped up or slowed down by at most
0.05%. This means adjusting the clock by 1 s takes 2000 s, and the
clock an be adjusted by at most 1.8 s per hour.
FreeBSD adjusts 5 ms per second if the remaining time adjustment is
>= 1 s (0.5%) , else it adjusts by 0.5 ms as well. This allows adjusting
by (almost) 18 s per hour.
Since Serenity OS can lose more than 22 s per hour (#3429), this
picks an adjustment rate up to 1% for now. This allows us to
adjust up to 36s per hour, which should be sufficient to adjust
the clock fast enough to keep up with how much time the clock
currently loses. Once we have a fancier NTP implementation that can
adjust tick rate in addition to offset, we can think about reducing
this.
adjtime is a bit old-school and most current POSIX-y OSs instead
implement adjtimex/ntp_adjtime, but a) we have to start somewhere
b) ntp_adjtime() is a fairly gnarly API. OpenBSD's adjfreq looks
like it might provide similar functionality with a nicer API. But
before worrying about all this, it's probably a good idea to get
to a place where the kernel APIs are (barely) good enough so that
we can write an ntp service, and once we have that we should write
a way to automatically evaluate how well it keeps the time adjusted,
and only then should we add improvements ot the adjustment mechanism.
Similar to Process, we need to make Thread refcounted. This will solve
problems that will appear once we schedule threads on more than one
processor. This allows us to hold onto threads without necessarily
holding the scheduler lock for the entire duration.
The implementation only supports a single iovec for now.
Some might say having more than one iovec is the main point of
recvmsg() and sendmsg(), but I'm interested in the control message
bits.
Since the CPU already does almost all necessary validation steps
for us, we don't really need to attempt to do this. Doing it
ourselves doesn't really work very reliably, because we'd have to
account for other processors modifying virtual memory, and we'd
have to account for e.g. pages not being able to be allocated
due to insufficient resources.
So change the copy_to/from_user (and associated helper functions)
to use the new safe_memcpy, which will return whether it succeeded
or not. The only manual validation step needed (which the CPU
can't perform for us) is making sure the pointers provided by user
mode aren't pointing to kernel mappings.
To make it easier to read/write from/to either kernel or user mode
data add the UserOrKernelBuffer helper class, which will internally
either use copy_from/to_user or directly memcpy, or pass the data
through directly using a temporary buffer on the stack.
Last but not least we need to keep syscall params trivial as we
need to copy them from/to user mode using copy_from/to_user.
Since "rings" typically refer to code execution and user processes
can also execute in ring 0, rename these functions to more accurately
describe what they mean: kernel processes and user processes.
This does not add any behaviour change to the processes, but it ties a
TTY to an active process group via TIOCSPGRP, and returns the TTY to the
kernel when all processes in the process group die.
Also makes the TTY keep a link to the original controlling process' parent (for
SIGCHLD) instead of the process itself.
This fixes a bunch of unchecked kernel reads and writes, seems like they
would might exploitable :). Write of sockaddr_in size to any address you
please...
Note that the data member is of type ImmutableBufferArgument, which has
no Userspace<T> usage. I left it alone for now, to be fixed in a future
change holistically for all usages.
This is racy in userspace and non-racy in kernelspace so let's keep
it in kernelspace.
The behavior change where CLOEXEC is preserved when dup2() is called
with (old_fd == new_fd) was good though, let's keep that.
Userspace<void*> is a bit strange here, as it would appear to the
user that we intend to de-refrence the pointer in kernel mode.
However I think it does a good join of illustrating that we are
treating the void* as a value type, instead of a pointer type.
This compiles, and fixes two bugs:
- setpgid() confusion (see previous commit)
- tcsetpgrp() now allows to set a non-empty process group even if
the group leader has already died. This makes Serenity slightly
more POSIX-compatible.
This compiles, and contains exactly the same bugs as before.
The regex 'FIXME: PID/' should reveal all markers that I left behind, including:
- Incomplete conversion
- Issues or things that look fishy
- Actual bugs that will go wrong during runtime
The way getsockopt is implemented for socket types requires us to push
down Userspace<T> using into those interfaces. This change does so, and
utilizes proper copy implementations instead of the kind of haphazard
pointer dereferencing that was occurring there before.
This change mostly converts poll to Userspace<T> with the caveat
of the fds member of SC_poll_params. It's current usage is a bit
too gnarly for me to take on right now, this appears to need a lot
more love.
In addition to enlightening the syscall to use Userspace<T>, I've
also re-worked most of the handling to use validate_read_and_copy
instead of just directly de-referencing the user pointer. We also
appeared to be missing a re-evaluation of the fds array after the
thread block is awoken.
Utilizie Userspace<T> for the syscall argument itself, as well
as internally in the SC_futex_params struct.
We were double validating the SC_futex_params.timeout validation,
that was removed as well.
- Remove goofy _r suffix from syscall names.
- Don't take a signed buffer size.
- Use Userspace<T>.
- Make TTY::tty_name() return a String instead of a StringView.
This syscall allows a parent process to disown a child process, setting
its parent PID to 0.
Unparented processes are automatically reaped by the kernel upon exit,
and no sys$waitid() is required. This will make it much nicer to do
spawn-and-forget which is common in the GUI environment.
By making the Process class RefCounted we don't really need
ProcessInspectionHandle anymore. This also fixes some race
conditions where a Process may be deleted while still being
used by ProcFS.
Also make sure to acquire the Process' lock when accessing
regions.
Last but not least, there's no reason why a thread can't be
scheduled while being inspected, though in practice it won't
happen anyway because the scheduler lock is held at the same
time.
Note: I switched from copying the single element out of the sched_param
struct, to copy struct it self as it is identical in functionality.
This way the types match up nicer with the Userpace<T> api's and it
conforms to the conventions used in other syscalls.
Since we already have the type information in the Userspace template,
it was a bit silly to cast manually everywhere. Just add a sufficiently
scary-sounding getter for a typed pointer.
Thanks @alimpfard for pointing out that I was being silly with tossing
out the type.
In the future we may want to make this API non-public as well.
This is something I've been meaning to do for a long time, and here we
finally go. This patch moves all sys$foo functions out of Process.cpp
and into files in Kernel/Syscalls/.
It's not exactly one syscall per file (although it could be, but I got
a bit tired of the repetitive work here..)
This makes hacking on individual syscalls a lot less painful since you
don't have to rebuild nearly as much code every time. I'm also hopeful
that this makes it easier to understand individual syscalls. :^)
For now, only the non-standard _SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF and
_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN are implemented.
Use them to make ninja pick a better default -j value.
While here, make the ninja package script not fail if
no other port has been built yet.
The AT_* entries are placed after the environment variables, so that
they can be found by iterating until the end of the envp array, and then
going even further beyond :^)
When delivering urgent signals to the current thread
we need to check if we should be unblocked, and if not
we need to yield to another process.
We also need to make sure that we suppress context switches
during Process::exec() so that we don't clobber the registers
that it sets up (eip mainly) by a context switch. To be able
to do that we add the concept of a critical section, which are
similar to Process::m_in_irq but different in that they can be
requested at any time. Calls to Scheduler::yield and
Scheduler::donate_to will return instantly without triggering
a context switch, but the processor will then asynchronously
trigger a context switch once the critical section is left.
These new syscalls allow you to send and receive file descriptors over
a local domain socket. This will enable various privilege separation
techniques and other good stuff. :^)
ppoll() is similar() to poll(), but it takes its timeout
as timespec instead of as int, and it takes an additional
sigmask parameter.
Change the sys$poll parameters to match ppoll() and implement
poll() in terms of ppoll().
It looks like they're considered a bad idea, so let's not add
them before we need them. I figured it's good to have them in
git history if we ever do need them though, hence the add/remove
dance.
Add seteuid()/setegid() under _POSIX_SAVED_IDS semantics,
which also requires adding suid and sgid to Process, and
changing setuid()/setgid() to honor these semantics.
The exact semantics aren't specified by POSIX and differ
between different Unix implementations. This patch makes
serenity follow FreeBSD. The 2002 USENIX paper
"Setuid Demystified" explains the differences well.
In addition to seteuid() and setegid() this also adds
setreuid()/setregid() and setresuid()/setresgid(), and
the accessors getresuid()/getresgid().
Also reorder uid/euid functions so that they are the
same order everywhere (namely, the order that
geteuid()/getuid() already have).
You now have to pledge "sigaction" to change signal handlers/dispositions. This
is to prevent malicious code from messing with assertions (and segmentation
faults), which are normally expected to instantly terminate the process but can
do other things if you change signal disposition for them.
This was a holdover from the old times when each Process had a special
main thread with TID 0. Using it was a total crapshoot since it would
just return whichever thread was first on the process's thread list.
Now that I've removed all uses of it, we don't need it anymore. :^)
Instead of falling back to the suspicious "any_thread()" mechanism,
just fail with ESRCH if you try to kill() a PID that doesn't have a
corresponding TID.
This was supposed to be the foundation for some kind of pre-kernel
environment, but nobody is working on it right now, so let's move
everything back into the kernel and remove all the confusion.
We stopped using gettimeofday() in Core::EventLoop a while back,
in favor of clock_gettime() for monotonic time.
Maintaining an optimization for a syscall we're not using doesn't make
a lot of sense, so let's go back to the old-style sys$gettimeofday().
Ultimately we should not panic just because we can't fully commit a VM
region (by populating it with physical pages.)
This patch handles some of the situations where commit() can fail.
This patch adds PageFaultResponse::OutOfMemory which informs the fault
handler that we were unable to allocate a necessary physical page and
cannot continue.
In response to this, the kernel will crash the current process. Because
we are OOM, we can't symbolicate the crash like we normally would
(since the ELF symbolication code needs to allocate), so we also
communicate to Process::crash() that we're out of memory.
Now we can survive "allocate 300 MB" (only the allocate process dies.)
This is definitely not perfect and can easily end up killing a random
innocent other process who happened to allocate one page at the wrong
time, but it's a *lot* better than panicking on OOM. :^)
This is a special case that was previously not implemented.
The idea is that you can dispatch a signal to all other processes
the calling process has access to.
There was some minor refactoring to make the self signal logic
into a function so it could easily be easily re-used from do_killall.
Previously, when returning from a pthread's start_routine, we would
segfault. Now we instead implicitly call pthread_exit as specified in
the standard.
pthread_create now creates a thread running the new
pthread_create_helper, which properly manages the calling and exiting
of the start_routine supplied to pthread_create. To accomplish this,
the thread's stack initialization has been moved out of
sys$create_thread and into the userspace function create_thread.
PT_SETTREGS sets the regsiters of the traced thread. It can only be
used when the tracee is stopped.
Also, refactor ptrace.
The implementation was getting long and cluttered the alraedy large
Process.cpp file.
This commit moves the bulk of the implementation to Kernel/Ptrace.cpp,
and factors out peek & poke to separate methods of the Process class.
This patch adds the minherit() syscall originally invented by OpenBSD.
Only the MAP_INHERIT_ZERO mode is supported for now. If set on an mmap
region, that region will be zeroed out on fork().
This commit adds a basic implementation of
the ptrace syscall, which allows one process
(the tracer) to control another process (the tracee).
While a process is being traced, it is stopped whenever a signal is
received (other than SIGCONT).
The tracer can start tracing another thread with PT_ATTACH,
which causes the tracee to stop.
From there, the tracer can use PT_CONTINUE
to continue the execution of the tracee,
or use other request codes (which haven't been implemented yet)
to modify the state of the tracee.
Additional request codes are PT_SYSCALL, which causes the tracee to
continue exection but stop at the next entry or exit from a syscall,
and PT_GETREGS which fethces the last saved register set of the tracee
(can be used to inspect syscall arguments and return value).
A special request code is PT_TRACE_ME, which is issued by the tracee
and causes it to stop when it calls execve and wait for the
tracer to attach.
This was only used by the mechanism for mapping executables into each
process's own address space. Now that we remap executables on demand
when needed for symbolication, this can go away.
Previously we would map the entire executable of a program in its own
address space (but make it unavailable to userspace code.)
This patch removes that and changes the symbolication code to remap
the executable on demand (and into the kernel's own address space
instead of the process address space.)
This opens up a couple of further simplifications that will follow.
Add an extra out-parameter to shbuf_get() that receives the size of the
shared buffer. That way we don't need to make a separate syscall to
get the size, which we always did immediately after.
This feels a lot more consistent and Unixy:
create_shared_buffer() => shbuf_create()
share_buffer_with() => shbuf_allow_pid()
share_buffer_globally() => shbuf_allow_all()
get_shared_buffer() => shbuf_get()
release_shared_buffer() => shbuf_release()
seal_shared_buffer() => shbuf_seal()
get_shared_buffer_size() => shbuf_get_size()
Also, "shared_buffer_id" is shortened to "shbuf_id" all around.
This allows a process wich has more than 1 thread to call exec, even
from a thread. This kills all the other threads, but it won't wait for
them to finish, just makes sure that they are not in a running/runable
state.
In the case where a thread does exec, the new program PID will be the
thread TID, to keep the PID == TID in the new process.
This introduces a new function inside the Process class,
kill_threads_except_self which is called on exit() too (exit with
multiple threads wasn't properly working either).
Inside the Lock class, there is the need for a new function,
clear_waiters, which removes all the waiters from the
Process::big_lock. This is needed since after a exit/exec, there should
be no other threads waiting for this lock, the threads should be simply
killed. Only queued threads should wait for this lock at this point,
since blocked threads are handled in set_should_die.
Replace Process::m_being_inspected with an inspector reference count.
This prevents an assertion from firing when inspecting the same process
in /proc from multiple processes at the same time.
It was trivially reproducible by opening multiple FileManagers.
This mechanism wasn't actually used to create any WeakPtr<Process>.
Such pointers would be pretty hard to work with anyway, due to the
multi-step destruction ritual of Process.
