This patch converts all the usage of AK::String around sys$execve() to
using KString instead, allowing us to catch and propagate OOM errors.
It also required changing the kernel CommandLine helper class to return
a vector of KString for the userspace init program arguments.
Make use of the new FileDescription::try_serialize_absolute_path() to
avoid String in favor of KString throughout much of sys$execve() and
its helpers.
I had to look at this for a moment before I realized that sys$execve()
and the spawning of /bin/SystemServer at boot are taking two different
paths out of exec().
Add a comment to help the next person looking at it. :^)
Before this patch, we were leaking a ref on the open file description
used for the interpreter (the dynamic loader) in sys$execve().
This surfaced when adapting the syscall to use TRY(), since we were now
correctly transferring ownership of the interpreter to Process::exec()
and no longer holding on to a local copy of it (in `elf_result`).
Fixing the leak uncovered another problem. The interpreter description
would now get destroyed when returning from do_exec(), which led to a
kernel panic when attempting to acquire a mutex.
This happens because we're in a particularly delicate state when
returning from do_exec(). Everything is primed for the upcoming context
switch into the new executable image, and trying to block the thread
at this point will panic the kernel.
We fix this by destroying the interpreter description earlier in
do_exec(), at the point where we no longer need it.
When executing a dynamically linked program, we need to pass the main
program executable via a file descriptor to the dynamic loader.
Before this patch, we were allocating an FD for this purpose long after
it was safe to do anything fallible. If we were unable to allocate an
FD we would simply panic the kernel(!)
We now hoist the allocation so it can fail before we've committed to
a new executable.
Due to the use of ELF::Image::for_each_program_header(), we were
previously unable to use TRY() in the ELF loading code (since the return
statement inside TRY() would only return from the iteration callback.)
Once we commit to a new executable image in sys$execve(), we can no
longer return with an error to whoever called us from userspace.
We must make sure to surface any potential errors before that point.
This patch moves signal trampoline allocation before the commit.
A number of other things remain to be moved.
We previously allowed Thread to exist in a state where its m_name was
null, and had to work around that in various places.
This patch removes that possibility and forces those who would create a
thread (or change the name of one) to provide a NonnullOwnPtr<KString>
with the name.
This expands the reach of error propagation greatly throughout the
kernel. Sadly, it also exposes the fact that we're allocating (and
doing other fallible things) in constructors all over the place.
This patch doesn't attempt to address that of course. That's work for
our future selves.
Prior to this change, both uid_t and gid_t were typedef'ed to `u32`.
This made it easy to use them interchangeably. Let's not allow that.
This patch adds UserID and GroupID using the AK::DistinctNumeric
mechanism we've already been employing for pid_t/ProcessID.
This patch replaces the remaining users of this API with the new
try_copy_kstring_from_user() instead. Note that we still convert to a
String for continued processing, and I've added FIXME about continuing
work on using KString all the way.
The compiler can re-order the structure (class) members if that's
necessary, so if we make Process to inherit from ProcFSExposedComponent,
even if the declaration is to inherit first from ProcessBase, then from
ProcFSExposedComponent and last from Weakable<Process>, the members of
class ProcFSExposedComponent (including the Ref-counted parts) are the
first members of the Process class.
This problem made it impossible to safely use the current toggling
method with the write-protection bit on the ProcessBase members, so
instead of inheriting from it, we make its members the last ones in the
Process class so we can safely locate and modify the corresponding page
write protection bit of these values.
We make sure that the Process class doesn't expand beyond 8192 bytes and
the protected values are always aligned on a page boundary.
Leave interrupts enabled so that we can still process IRQs. Critical
sections should only prevent preemption by another thread.
Co-authored-by: Tom <tomut@yahoo.com>
By making these functions static we close a window where we could get
preempted after calling Processor::current() and move to another
processor.
Co-authored-by: Tom <tomut@yahoo.com>
...and also RangeAllocator => VirtualRangeAllocator.
This clarifies that the ranges we're dealing with are *virtual* memory
ranges and not anything else.
The way the Process::FileDescriptions::allocate() API works today means
that two callers who allocate back to back without associating a
FileDescription with the allocated FD, will receive the same FD and thus
one will stomp over the other.
Naively tracking which FileDescriptions are allocated and moving onto
the next would introduce other bugs however, as now if you "allocate"
a fd and then return early further down the control flow of the syscall
you would leak that fd.
This change modifies this behavior by tracking which descriptions are
allocated and then having an RAII type to "deallocate" the fd if the
association is not setup the end of it's scope.
Before we start disabling acquisition of the big process lock for
specific syscalls, make sure to document and assert that all the
lock is held during all syscalls.
The System V ABI for both x86 and x86_64 requires that the stack pointer
is 16-byte aligned on entry. Previously we did not align the stack
pointer properly.
As far as "main" was concerned the stack alignment was correct even
without this patch due to how the C++ _start function and the kernel
interacted, i.e. the kernel misaligned the stack as far as the ABI
was concerned but that misalignment (read: it was properly aligned for
a regular function call - but misaligned in terms of what the ABI
dictates) was actually expected by our _start function.
`.text` segments with non-aligned offsets had their lengths applied to
the first page's base address. This meant that in some cases the last
PAGE_SIZE - 1 bytes weren't mapped. Previously, it did not cause any
problems as the GNU ld insists on aligning everything; but that's not
the case with the LLVM toolchain.
This replaces all uses of LexicalPath in the Kernel with the functions
from KLexicalPath. This also allows the Kernel to stop including
AK::LexicalPath.
Specifically, explicitly specify the checked type, use the resulting
value instead of doing the same calculation twice, and break down
calculations to discrete operations to ensure no intermediary overflows
are missed.
The Process::Handler type has KResultOr<FlatPtr> as its return type.
Using a different return type with an equally-sized template parameter
sort of works but breaks once that condition is no longer true, e.g.
for KResultOr<int> on x86_64.
Ideally the syscall handlers would also take FlatPtrs as their args
so we can get rid of the reinterpret_cast for the function pointer
but I didn't quite feel like cleaning that up as well.
This adds just enough stubs to make the kernel compile on x86_64. Obviously
it won't do anything useful - in fact it won't even attempt to boot because
Multiboot doesn't support ELF64 binaries - but it gets those compiler errors
out of the way so more progress can be made getting all the missing
functionality in place.
When you invoke a binary with a shebang line, the `execve` syscall
makes sure to pass along command line arguments to the shebang
interpreter including the path to the binary to execute.
This does not work well when the binary lives in $PATH. For example,
given this script living in `/usr/local/bin/my-script`:
#!/bin/my-interpreter
echo "well hello friends"
When executing it as `my-script` from outside `/usr/local/bin/`, it is
executed as `/bin/my-interpreter my-script`. To make sure that the
interpreter can find the binary to execute, we need to replace the
first argument with an absolute path to the binary, so that the
resulting command is:
/bin/my-interpreter /usr/local/bin/my-script
When a process executes another program, its unveil state is reset. For
this, we not only need to clear all nodes from m_unveiled_paths, but
also reset the metadata of m_unveiled_paths (the root node) itself.
This fixes the following bug:
1) A process unveils "/", then executes another program.
2) That other program also unveils some path.
3) "/" is now unveiled for the new program.
Previously the process' m_profiling flag was ignored for all event
types other than CPU samples.
The kfree tracing code relies on temporarily disabling tracing during
exec. This didn't work for per-process profiles and would instead
panic.
This updates the profiling code so that the m_profiling flag isn't
ignored.
By constraining two implementations, the compiler will select the best
fitting one. All this will require is duplicating the implementation and
simplifying for the `void` case.
This constraining also informs both the caller and compiler by passing
the callback parameter types as part of the constraint
(e.g.: `IterationFunction<int>`).
Some `for_each` functions in LibELF only take functions which return
`void`. This is a minimal correctness check, as it removes one way for a
function to incompletely do something.
There seems to be a possible idiom where inside a lambda, a `return;` is
the same as `continue;` in a for-loop.
Previously we'd try to load ELF images which did not have
an interpreter set with an incorrect load offset of 0, i.e. way
outside of the part of the address space where we'd expect either
the dynamic loader or the user's executable to reside.
This fixes the problem by using get_load_offset for both executables
which have an interpreter set and those which don't. Notably this
allows us to actually successfully execute the Loader.so binary:
courage:~ $ /usr/lib/Loader.so
You have invoked `Loader.so'. This is the helper program for programs
that use shared libraries. Special directives embedded in executables
tell the kernel to load this program.
This helper program loads the shared libraries needed by the program,
prepares the program to run, and runs it. You do not need to invoke
this helper program directly.
courage:~ $
This turns the perfcore format into more a log than it was before,
which lets us properly log process, thread and region
creation/destruction. This also makes it unnecessary to dump the
process' regions every time it is scheduled like we did before.
Incidentally this also fixes 'profile -c' because we previously ended
up incorrectly dumping the parent's region map into the profile data.
Log-based mmap support enables profiling shared libraries which
are loaded at runtime, e.g. via dlopen().
This enables profiling both the parent and child process for
programs which use execve(). Previously we'd discard the profiling
data for the old process.
The Profiler tool has been updated to not treat thread IDs as
process IDs anymore. This enables support for processes with more
than one thread. Also, there's a new widget to filter which
process should be displayed.
SPDX License Identifiers are a more compact / standardized
way of representing file license information.
See: https://spdx.dev/resources/use/#identifiers
This was done with the `ambr` search and replace tool.
ambr --no-parent-ignore --key-from-file --rep-from-file key.txt rep.txt *
Previously the dynamic loader would become unused after it had invoked
the program's entry function. However, in order to support exceptions
and - at a later point - dlfcn functionality we need to call back
into the dynamic loader at runtime.
Because the dynamic loader has a static copy of LibC it'll attempt to
invoke syscalls directly from its text segment. For this to work the
executable region for the dynamic loader needs to have syscalls enabled.
We previously ignored these values in the return value of
load_elf_object, which causes us to not allocate a TLS region for
statically-linked programs.
The previous architecture had a huge flaw: the pointer to the protected
data was itself unprotected, allowing you to overwrite it at any time.
This patch reorganizes the protected data so it's part of the Process
class itself. (Actually, it's a new ProcessBase helper class.)
We use the first 4 KB of Process objects themselves as the new storage
location for protected data. Then we make Process objects page-aligned
using MAKE_ALIGNED_ALLOCATED.
This allows us to easily turn on/off write-protection for everything in
the ProcessBase portion of Process. :^)
Thanks to @bugaevc for pointing out the flaw! This is still not perfect
but it's an improvement.
Process member variable like m_euid are very valuable targets for
kernel exploits and until now they have been writable at all times.
This patch moves m_euid along with a whole bunch of other members
into a new Process::ProtectedData struct. This struct is remapped
as read-only memory whenever we don't need to write to it.
This means that a kernel write primitive is no longer enough to
overwrite a process's effective UID, you must first unprotect the
protected data where the UID is stored. :^)
(...and ASSERT_NOT_REACHED => VERIFY_NOT_REACHED)
Since all of these checks are done in release builds as well,
let's rename them to VERIFY to prevent confusion, as everyone is
used to assertions being compiled out in release.
We can introduce a new ASSERT macro that is specifically for debug
checks, but I'm doing this wholesale conversion first since we've
accumulated thousands of these already, and it's not immediately
obvious which ones are suitable for ASSERT.
The `default_signal_action(u8 signal)` function already has the
full mapping. The only caveat being that now we need to make
sure the thread constructor and clear_signals() method do the work
of resetting the m_signal_action_data array, instead or relying on
the previous logic in set_default_signal_dispositions.
If we have a tracer process waiting for us to exec, we need to release
the ptrace lock before stopping ourselves, since otherwise the tracer
will block forever on the lock.
Fixes#5409.
